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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3046
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7263

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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
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CIA FOR WINPAC
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-094.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 3, 2009
Time: 4:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) U.S. and Russian representatives to the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) met for a shortened session following a meeting of the Definitions Subgroup. The sides reviewed Article III and resolved some bracketed language. Major points for discussion involved accountability of nuclear warheads and inclusion of mobile launchers of ICBMs among existing types of ICBMs. Article IV was mostly agreed with the exception of certain sub-limits concerning test ranges, space launch facilities, and test and training heavy bombers. In Article IX, the Russian side provisionally agreed with the U.S. position to preclude concealment measures that impede verification. End Summary.

¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Article III; On to Article IV; Article IX.

ARTICLE III

15. (S) Mr. Taylor and ADM Kuznetsov began the working group while Amb Ries and Mr. Koshelev conducted a separate one-on-one discussion. Taylor reviewed outstanding issues related to Article III on counting rules. For paragraph 7 (listing of existing types of strategic offensive arms (SOA)), he proposed language to ease Russian concerns over a separate sub-paragraph devoted to mobile ICBMs. The proposal would drop the separate paragraph for existing types of mobile ICBMs. Instead, all existing types of ICBMs would be listed together in one sub-paragraph with an additional phrase identifying those ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Kuznetsov agreed to take the proposal for study.

16. (S) In paragraph 2 (counting rules toward the aggregate limit), Taylor asked whether the Russian side had constructed alternate language for treatment for deployed heavy bombers, to which Kuznetsov replied there was nothing new. Kuznetsov embarked on a monologue in which he stated he was not able to understand the proposed U.S. counting rules for heavy bombers. He went on say the latest proposal to count three warheads for each deployed heavy bomber was difficult to grasp, and was further compounded by the lack of agreed terms to define deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. He noted the Russian side had proposed new definitions to support its position almost 3 weeks earlier and had yet to hear a formal response from the U.S. side. Taylor explained the original text for paragraph 2 had been formulated when the United States had proposed inspections of nuclear weapon storage areas. Since the U.S. position had changed, revised language would be required. Taylor undertook to provide some more

clarifying language on paragraph 2 for the next meeting.

17. (S) Kuznetsov stated the Russian side was withdrawing its language for 4bis (Russian-proposed counting rules for deployed SOA). Turning to paragraph 5 (end of the life cycle for counting SOA), Kuznetsov stated the Russian side had no objections to the proposed language, though he wanted no reference to the protocol or reference to the role played by the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

18. (S) For paragraph 6 (when new types would be considered subject to treaty provisions), Kuznetsov asked about sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) which addressed treatment of new types of conventional and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Taylor stated the United States was still considering the Russian proposal to drop "nuclear" from sub-paragraph (c). At this point, Kuznetsov and Ms. Kotkova proposed deletion of paragraph (b) (exclusion of conventional-only ballistic missiles), deletion of the word "nuclear" from sub-paragraph (c) (ballistic missiles flight tested for nuclear armaments), and replacement of ballistic missile in sub-paragraph (c) with weapon delivery vehicle. Taylor advised that the United States would take the proposal for study. At that point Kuznetsov determined the two major issues left in Article III were accountability of nuclear warheads and inclusion of mobile launchers of ICBMs among existing types of ICBMs.

ON TO ARITCLE IV

19. (S) Kuznetsov noted that he had received, the day before, the latest U.S.-proposed draft for Article IV on locational and numerical re strictions. In principle, there were no issues with the exception of paragraph 1(b) (location of deployed launchers of SLBMs), which evoked a spirited debate on the meaning of this one sentence. Taylor appreciated the difficulty the Russian side might have in accepting the language from a linguistic perspective; however, the language used ("Each party shall locate deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile submarines based at submarine bases.") was similar in wording and concept to the language for locational and related re strictions found in START Article IV, paragraph 9(a).

¶10. (S) Kotkova agreed in principle, but her logic ran that there should be a direct link between the deployed launcher and the submarine without the intermediate step of a submarine base to further define the location. Mr. Dean acknowledged the point, but stated the logic rested on what would be the final definition of a deployed launcher of SLBMs.

¶11. (S) This prompted another appeal by Kuznetsov for agreement on key terms for deployed and non-deployed systems. Looking at the term for deployed launchers of SLBMs, Taylor noted the key feature for the launcher of SLBMs was its installation on a submarine that had itself been launched. The Russian version of the definition said a launcher of SLBMs meant an SLBM launcher that contained an SLBM and was not intended for testing or training. To accept the Russian proposal one would have to know that the launcher was located in a submarine. Kotkova replied that the locational clarification was not the requirement of the definition but

of the treaty articles. Both sides finally agreed to the language of the sentence by dropping the phrase indicating the submarine containing a deployed SLBM launcher was "based at a submarine base."

¶12. (S) At this point, as time was running short, Kuznetsov quickly covered the Russian positions for the remaining paragraphs of Article IV:

- Paragraph 2 (deployed heavy bomber location) was agreed, but Kuznetsov again asked for an agreed definition of heavy bombers.
- In paragraph 3 (limits on non-deployeds), Kuznetsov said he now understood this to mean the Parties would have 7 years to reach this limit. He requested the U.S.-proposed text be redrafted to spell that out in writing.
- For paragraph 4 (locations of non-deployed launchers and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs), the Russian side agreed to virtually all text in sub-paragraph 4(a) including the U.S. proposal for prototypes, but left "space launch facility" in brackets. Paragraph 4(b) was also agreed with the exception of "space launch facility."
- In paragraph 5 (transit limits), the Russian side agreed to the U.S. language.
- For paragraph 6 (limit on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges), Kuznetsov was not willing to budge. This paragraph was still bracketed.
- For paragraph 7 (limit of test launchers only to test ranges), the Russian side was in agreement. Paragraph 8 (location of training launchers) was also agreed.
- In paragraph 9 (limit on test heavy bombers), the Russian side did not agree.
- In paragraph 10 (basing of test and training heavy bombers), Kuznetsov said he was not able to understand the U.S. position. He indicated no progress was possible until a definition of a deployed heavy bomber could be agreed.

ARTICLE IX

¶13. (S) Having completed their one-on-one discussions, Ries and Koshelev rejoined the working group. Ries raised Article IX, paragraph 3, and asked the Russian side about its objections to the U.S.-proposed language precluding concealment measures that impede verification. Ries pressed the Russian side to acknowledge that the language of the opening sentence, which was agreed, meant that impediments to verification could not be used at space launch facilities. Kotkova agreed, but opined the language in the second sentence which listed various facilities captured by this

paragraph was redundant in light of the wording of the opening sentence. Ries responded that the second sentence served the function of elaboration of the concept, while the third sentence provided for operational exclusions. At this point, the Russian side agreed to the language of this second

sentence. Kuznetsov then raised the final sentence related to operational exclusions from impediments to verification. He said the Russian side disagreed with language referring specifically to road mobile launchers of ICBMs. Kuznetsov raised the issue of definitions again, saying the matter could be clarified if both sides could agree to definitions for "basing area," "deployment area," "restricted area," and "ICBM base." Ries proposed compromise language for treatment of road mobiles, which the Russian side provisionally accepted.

¶14. (U) Documents provided: None.

¶15. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Highsmith
Mr. Taylor
Ms. Zdravecky
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Kamenskiy
ADM Kuznetsov
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Trifinov
Ms. Evanovskaya (Int)

¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS